Their concern is to investigate informally the prospects for a strategic triangle proposed by the Russian premier, Yevgeny Primakov, in December However innovative it may be, contemporary tendencies towards this idea of an Asian triangle are nonetheless not without tensions. He shows that, even while she extols a multipolar ideal, China is above all concerned with establishing itself as the alter ego of the United States in the Asian theatre, and this means ensuring that no other power, such as India or Japan, be allowed to cast a shadow over such ambitions.
And whereas the Indo-Russian and the Sino-Russian links are relatively firm, Sino-Indian relations, notwithstanding their increased warmth, are still undoubtedly the weakest link. Even though the idea of an Asian triangle has arisen out of a shared disquiet in the face of the American superpower, that country remains the privileged partner of each of the three others, and this fact undoubtedly places a limit on their prospects for co-operation.
But, according to these authors, a trilateral rapprochement may still provide a tempting option, if it permits each participant to increase its power, while helping to preserve regional security. Finally, in an exploratory chapter, Kanti Bajpai identifies a certain number of problem areas in which India, Russia and China could strengthen their co-operation.
These include Islamic terrorism, the American anti-missile defence plan, and the energy reserves in Central Asia. One of the immediate goals would be progress from the conceptual stage to the beginnings of a working partnership, however limited.
The overall survey undertaken by this volume could perhaps have been more complete with the participation of a Russian expert. And, looking further ahead, it would be particularly interesting to have an American view of the prospect of a formal entente between the three major Asian powers. Intricacies of an Asian Triangle. A multidisciplinary journal providing analysis of the latest political, economical, social and cultural trends in the Chinese world.
Perspectives chinoises. Contents - Previous document. Book reviews. New Delhi, Lancers Books, , p. Editor's notes Translated from the French original by Jonathan Hall. Full text PDF Send by e-mail.
India And The South Asian Strategic Triangle Kapur Ashok
Six frontline Indian naval ships, including frigates and destroyers, took part in the commissioning. Kadamba extends over 11, acres of land, along a km stretch of sea front, and it will be the first base exclusively controlled by India's navy. Eleven ships can be berthed at Kadamba once the first phase of it is achieved; 22 ships can be berthed there after the second phase of construction is completed around , according to INS Kadamba's first Commanding Officer Commodore K P Ramachandran.
The China- Pakistan-India triangle is more than ever the Arabian Sea's decisive geostrategic setting. For the Chinese, this trilateral relationship is crucial for two reasons: from the point of view of energy security, the Arabian Sea and Pakistan are Beijing's access points to the oil-rich Middle East; from the perspective of military security, Pakistan provides China an effective counter- balancing partner in front of India's ambitions. Therefore, faced with geographic constraints, the Chinese successfully proposed to Islamabad in the sharing of the Gwadar naval base.
This latter serves the Chinese purposes in three ways: first, it serves as a tool to secure Beijing's access to the Gulf's resources; second, it is a useful military base to counter Washington's influence in Central and South Asia in fact, the Sino-Pakistani agreement came into being just four months after US troops entered Kabul in ; third, Gwadar functions as an excellent wedge between India and the Middle East and as an offset against India's naval power.
The issue of India's Air Force Recently, Air Chief Marshall Tyagi wrote to Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee pointing out that "Unless immediate steps are taken to arrest the reduction in Indian Air Force's force levels, the nation will for the first time in its history, lose the conventional military edge over Pakistan.
According to some sources, India's needs have rapidly attracted the interests of some major global players. Strategic partnerships On 2 March , the US and India reached agreement on their controversial nuclear deal, which must be approved by the US Congress and is causing political disputes among US and Indian parties. The deal would provide India with American nuclear technology and fuel, without India having to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Moreover, Delhi would have to open only 14 of its 22 nuclear reactors to international inspections. Although some Indian factions believe that it would be very difficult for Delhi to separate civilian and military nuclear activities, the majority of the deal's critics think that Washington would endanger the entire non-proliferation architecture without getting any real guarantee on India's nuclear relations with other powers.
As of early November , when the US had its mid-term elections, it seems likely that the final decision by Washington will be postponed to However, the significance of the US-Indian nuclear deal goes beyond the mere cooperation on atomic power and reveals a changing mutual perception by the two parties.
JPRI Occasional Paper No. 48
After the end of the Cold War, India has progressively emerged as the South Asian potential hegemon and as a power with global ambitions. India's traditional pro-Russian stance was mitigated in favour of a more independent foreign policy, and the US rapidly emerged as a potential strategic partner rather than adversary in the eyes of many Indian decision- makers, although the more Socialist-oriented factions in Delhi still hold political influence.
Such an evolution does not mean a complete reversal of the Cold War period.
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In fact, India is trying to expand its network of strategic cooperation rather than playing one alignment for instance, the one with the US against other ones. Washington would like to keep excellent strategic relations with both Pakistan and India; however, in contrast to the Cold War situation, it is likely that India will become the US favourite South Asian strategic partner in the next decade. Should the US-Indian nuclear deal fail to be implemented, however, the strategic rapprochement between Washington and Delhi would be delayed and complicated, and Russia would probably benefit from Delhi's disappointment.
These problems notwithstanding, the common US and Indian perception of China as a potential Asian hegemon that needs to be checked will push Washington and Delhi toward cooperation in the long run. Further, since Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan are perceived by India both as geopolitical rivals—played by China as encircling forces to contain India's rise—and as the sources of social destabilization because of their developed Islamist networks, it is likely that Delhi will seek US help against Muslim extremism and the ensuing militant activities.
As a result, a comprehensive strategic partnership with India seems to be appealing to Washington both as a geopolitical tool to check Beijing and as a political, cultural, and military rampart against Islamism in South Asia. With Islamabad, relations have improved since but both countries have failed to radically transform their rivalry into an even embryonic cooperation.
Strategic triangle in South Asia
The Kashmir region has already witnessed three Indo-Pakistani wars in , and plus a more limited conflict in , and its political and territorial status remains unsettled. Both the rise of China and the instability of India's neighbourhood Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka suggest that a strategic rapprochement with Washington will be sought by Delhi even if the current nuclear deal meets with fatal obstacles in US politics.
In fact, at a time when the US is experiencing serious troubles in achieving its strategic goals in the Middle East, in Afghanistan and in North-East Asia, the eventuality of a complete failure of the new US-Indian strategic dialogue would be a deadly blow to Washington's geostrategy. Federico Bordonaro 7 November Related Papers.
By Vidhan Pathak. China pak india nexus pdf. By Riddhi Chopra.